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ABSTRACT
This theoretical study explores therapeutic impasse through the
dual lens of relational theory and infant research. Particular
attention is paid to the role that enactment, rupture and repair, and
non-verbal communication play in impasse dynamics. Defined broadly--as
any time a therapist and patient feel stuck--impasse is conceptualized
as an expectable, even inevitable, component of the treatment
relationship. This paper further posits that small moments of impasse
hold potential for growth. Finally, the implications for navigating
impasse are considered through a clinical vignette.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

From the complications of loving you
I think there is no end or return.
No answer, no coming out of it.
Which is the only way to love, isn't it?
This isn't a playground, this is
earth, our heaven, for a while.
Therefore I have given precedence
to all my sudden, sullen, dark moods
that hold you in the center of my world.
And I say to my body: grow thinner still.
And I say to my fingers, type me a pretty song.
And I say to my heart: rave on.
--A Pretty Song, Mary Oliver

The dictionary defines impasse as a road or passage having no
exit; a situation that is so difficult that no progress can be made; a
deadlock (American Heritage Dictionary, 2000). For the most part,
psychoanalytic theory has hewed closely to this definition, equating
impasse with failed treatment. Historically, discussions of impasse
were either shied away from altogether in the literature, or shrouded
in words such as avoidance (Balint, 1952), last resort (Buxbaum, 1954),
risk (Loewenstein, 1954), stubbornness (Giovacchini, 1961),
hopelessness (Ulanov, 1973), depletion, despair (Gorney, 1979), and
paralysis (Maldonado, 1984).
This study is concerned with broadening the definition and
understanding of therapeutic impasse. But it also endeavors to
circumscribe the belief that impasse is inherently damaging to a
treatment. By opening up the definition of clinical impasse to include
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any time a patient and therapist feel stuck, impasse comes to be
conceptualized as expectable, inevitable even. The essential question
is no longer how do we avoid impasse, but rather, how do we find
ourselves in such spots? What do they mean for treatment? And, perhaps
most importantly, how do we find our way through?
Impasse is a phenomenon encountered by all clinicians at all
levels of experience. Yet the literature most frequently addresses
protracted and wayward stalemates, a variety of impasse few beginning
clinicians will face. To that end, in addition to charting a brief
history of the literature on impasse in Chapter II, this theoretical
study attends to more subtle impasse experiences as well. In doing so
it attempts to address a significant gap in the literature, of
particular relevance to beginning clinicians.
Toward developing an understanding of impasse, I first turn to
relational theory. Chapter III attempts to illuminate impasse through
enactment, a phenomenon that some relational analysts consider
synonymous with impasse. Chapter IV presents an understanding of
impasse derived from infancy research, pulling particularly from models
of rupture-repair and nonverbal communication. Just as a relational
approach views enactment as inevitable and necessary, such is the case
with rupture and repair through an infancy lens. Finally, the two
frameworks are synthesized in Chapter V, through the Case of Bee, a
vignette drawn from my own first-year clinical placement.
I suggest that when viewed together, these two theoretical
sensibilities open a therapist’s awareness to all of what may be
happening between clinician and patient during moments of impasse--from
the interpersonal and intrapsychic to the relational and behavioral,
explicit and implicit, spoken and non-verbal. In conjunction,
relational theory and infancy research offer a frame from which to work
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with impasse. Through these two theories, clinicians are able to
glimpse the transformation and growth that are the counterpoint to even
small moments of impasse.
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CHAPTER II
ON THE PHENOMENON OF IMPASSE

Loss, mourning, the longing for memory, the desire to enter into the
world around you and having no idea how to do it, the fear of observing
too coldly or too distractedly or too raggedly, the rage of cowardice,
the insight that is always arriving late, as defiant hindsight….
[These] are the stopping places along the way.
--Ruth Behar, The Vulnerable Observer
The patient is wondering why the analyst doesn’t get it when the
patient has tried to show her a hundred times. The analyst feels
defeated by the patient’s refusal of her understanding, and the patient
is convinced the analyst doesn’t understand or can’t help.
--Jessica Benjamin, Recognition and Destruction: An Outline of
Intersubjectivity
Early in her collection of essays, The Vulnerable Observer,
anthropologist Ruth Behar (1996) relays the story of a photographer, a
reporter who stood by helplessly snapping pictures as a young Colombian
woman drowned in mud. Then suddenly, he reaches out to her.
Behar (1996) identifies this tension, between observing and
intervening, containing and enacting, as “the central dilemma of all
efforts at witnessing” (p. 2). In essence what Behar describes in that
moment when the photographer stands frozen, unsure of how to proceed,
is a snapshot of impasse. It is an experience routinely encountered by
those professional witnesses who are therapists as well.
The work that goes on in the consulting room and the impassable
moments that take shape there may seem far removed from the life and
death drama of a Colombian mudslide. Yet the literature often portrays
impasse as a juncture where the fate of a therapy stands in the
balance. One writer on the subject portentously suggests, “At moments
of impasse, both the therapist and the patient are subjected to the
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ultimate test. What is each of them willing to do to save the therapy?”
(Darwin, 1999, p. 468). Another clinician, in the aftermath of impasse,
describes a patient recalling that it “felt like another life and death
situation in which one of us would have to ‘die’ so that the other
would live” (Ringstrom, 1998, p. 312). And from the analyst’s
perspective, a third offers: “I often find myself feeling that I am
engaged in some kind of life and death battle for my sanity and mental
integrity” (Davies, 2004, p. 719). The ultimate test, indeed.
Yet impasse occurs on a continuum. Certainly there are ruptures
so deep there seems little hope of recovery (Elkind, 1992; Pizer, 2004)
as well as intractable deadlocks. Perhaps more common, though, and less
carefully documented, are the subtle, everyday moments--marked by
boredom, confusion, stagnation, and missattunement. They are the
experiences that suggest, rather than feeling as though impasse
intrudes on therapy, we might be better served in thinking of impasse
as simply another part of therapy.
I first became interested in impasse while trying to make sense
of an experience with a patient during my first-year clinical
placement. A group that I was co-leading with another intern slogged
along over weeks as we endeavored to negotiate and re-negotiate one
patient’s feelings of safety in relation to another. But the more
effort we made to accommodate Bee, whose case will be discussed in
Chapter V, the more deeply mired we seemed to become. It was not one of
the enduring or “dramatically wrong” (Pizer, 2004, p. 2929) bouts that
populate the impasse literature. Nonetheless, to a nascent clinician
trying to navigate her way through, it felt significant.
The way in which I came to understand this case drew largely on
the concepts of enactment, rupture and repair, and nonverbal
communication--the former drawn from relational theory, the latter

5

concepts as described by infancy studies. Together, they are the
primary phenomena and theories that will be developed in this thesis,
toward a conceptualization of impasse.

Toward a New Definition
Faltering and missteps have come to be recognized as unavoidable
parts of the therapeutic process. In defining impasse broadly--as any
time a therapist and patient feel stuck--I hope to suggest the
experience of impasse can also be viewed through this lens. It need not
be dramatized nor shied away from. As with any other aspect of the
clinical encounter, where “self-correction is our way of life”
(Benjamin, 2009, p. 443), perhaps we will come to see impasse as just
one more component of the treatment process, just another part of our
way of life.
Though a therapy may seem to have lost momentum (Harris, 2009) or
come to a stand still, the very act of surviving and working through
(Freud, 1914) a therapeutic impasse may ultimately be what moves
treatment forward. Even small moments of impasse hold the potential for
growth. Woven together, routine impasse experiences give texture to our
relationships, both within and outside the consulting room. They are
deserving of deeper exploration.
In what follows, I attempt a brief review of the psychoanalytic
literature on the historical development of impasse. From there I will
offer an introduction to the more contemporary relational and infancybased understandings that anchor subsequent chapters. This section
highlights the shift in psychoanalytic theory from thinking of impasse
as a state of resistance located within the patient to a shared
experience, one co-constructed and co-negotiated by patient and
therapist alike. It parallels the field’s broader shift from a “one-
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person psychology” to a relational perspective that accounts for the
subjectivities of both patient and analyst. This orientation is
furthered by the dyadic view of mother-infant interactions that has
come to be the hallmark of contemporary infancy studies.

A History of Impasse
Freud’s Case: Impasse as Transference
The earliest clinical example of impasse dates back to Freud
(1905) and his turn-of-the-century analysis of Ida Bauer, a young woman
he called Dora. Ultimately Dora, suffering from what Freud (1905)
termed “petite hystérie” (p.23), resolved their stalemate. She leaves
treatment and a somewhat befuddled Freud after three months--instead of
the yearlong analysis that he had prescribed. Their case is a study in
what Elkind (1992) might call unresolved impasse leading to a ruptured
termination.
Well before the end of treatment, Freud (1905) conveys a feeling
associated with the more garden variety of impasse: boredom. He writes
that alongside her lingering, nervous cough, Dora “kept on repeating
her complaints against her father with a wearisome monotony” (Freud,
1905, p.46). Freud uses his feeling of tedium as a way into Dora’s
latent sense that her impotent father, who had referred her to
treatment, was engaging in oral sex with his mistress. Yet one can’t
help but wonder whether perhaps Dora’s complaints were in fact a way of
expressing dissatisfaction with Freud and her treatment?
At the time, Freud (1905) was just beginning to uncover the
concept and utility of transference, speculating that early in their
work he might have been for Dora a desirable father figure. In
“Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria,” Freud (1905) further
recognizes that he played a role in the two dreams that Dora brought to
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analysis. He suggests that his failure to identify this transference
early enough may have caused their rupture, postulating that had he
taken more seriously Dora’s clear hint of not returning to treatment-just as she ran away from her aspiring older suitor--their work
together might have continued. Freud nonetheless seems naively unaware
of his own more subjective role and feelings in the development of
Dora’s analysis and their impasse--specifically the depth of his
countertransference. Later, Freud comes to understand impasse as a
transference phenomenon, a resistance on the part of the patient to
unconscious desires and affects (Darwin, 1999).
As with Freud and Dora, clinicians writing on impasse have
historically focused on the patient, relegating the therapist to the
background. If described at all, the therapist’s function was treated
as a signal or vessel for impasse that actually resided within the
patient’s internal world (Harris, 2009). This emphasis on the
transference--the notion that the difficulty of impasse lay in the
patient--remained the model from Freud’s early 20th-century drive theory
through ego psychology and into the self psychology of the 1980s.
Whereas drive theory conceived of impasse in terms of the
patient’s resistance, ego psychology viewed impasse as the result of
conflicts between the patient’s id, ego, and superego. Early self
psychology attributed impasse to the patient’s fragmentation in the
face of the therapist’s empathic failure. While this final analysis
shifted the thinking closer to a contemporary relational understanding,
it remained stubbornly fixed on the patient’s fragmented response,
rather than the clinician’s part in generating that response (Darwin,
1999).
Summarizing the prevailing understanding of impasse from Freud
through Kohut, Darwin (1999) writes,
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The patient brings the therapeutic process to a halt
because (1) he can't own his own wishes, (2) his ego is not
strong enough to regulate his id and/or his superego, (3)
he has unacceptable thoughts and feelings which must be
disavowed, or (4) his self is not sufficiently cohesive to
withstand empathic failure (p. 460).
In all these formulations, writes Darwin (1999), “Blame for impasses is
thus laid at the feet of the patient” (p. 460). Impasse was indeed
understood as primarily a transference phenomenon. The analyst was
rarely implicated.

Rowley’s Case: Transference Continued
In another example of the prominence of transference, Rowley, a
British psychoanalyst in the Independent Group writing in the 1950s,
describes his work with young and unmarried Emily Standish. She enters
treatment two years after becoming frightened at a dance. Emily
subsequently finds herself plagued by a general self-consciousness and
discomfort around people.
Rowley (1951) understands their work in terms of “revealing and
naming of the unknown” (p. 195). Their treatment impasse is marked by
Emily’s extreme inhibition, which manifests itself as a difficulty
speaking freely and revealing her dream life to her analyst. Writing
largely in libidinal and aggressive drive terms, Rowley views Emily’s
relational pattern with men as one in which she first stimulates and
then frustrates. In her life outside the consulting room, Emily does
not let her partner engage in intercourse. In the consulting room, she
will not give her analyst the material he needs to do his work. The
parallel process of impasse, both in the therapeutic dyad and in
Emily’s romantic relationship, is worth noting, if only to remind us of
the encompassing nature of relational impasse.

9

Despite what Rowley (1951) perceives as Emily’s “defiant attempt
to keep control by rendering the analyst powerless, impotent and
castrated” (p. 190), he reports that they are eventually able to work
through her efforts at frustrating both analyst and his analysis. In
this closely recounted case, however, Rowley makes hardly any mention
of his role in either their therapeutic relationship or the resulting
impasse. He simply describes the many ways in which Emily has acted
upon him--whether it is what she has done to him or the reactions she
has incited in him.
Once Emily can speak more freely, Rowley (1951) finds himself
less stimulated. It is anti-climactic. He apologizes to the reader for
not instilling the case study with more excitement. Though to his mind
this can’t be helped--it is, after all, the fault of the patient. Again
he consigns the phenomenon to Emily:
In considering it, the analyst could then appreciate to the
full the patient's pattern of behaviour--that she had
indeed been attempting to stimulate him, only to disappoint
him later; no climax, as such, having been permitted by the
patient to occur (Rowley, 1951, p. 192).
Rowley’s (1951) understanding of the case and his write-up are redolent
of Freud and Dora. Like Freud (1905), operating from within a paradigm
that didn’t leave room for his subjectivity, Rowley is woefully unaware
of his own presence in the analysis or of his countertransferential
feelings toward his young patient. As a result, he seems equally
oblivious to how he may be a co-participant in their impasse.

Weiner’s Case: Impasse as Structural Conflict
When the clinician’s contributing role in shaping impasse did
first become an area of inquiry, it was initially only insofar as the
therapist failed to effectively manage the patient. The literature
warns that impasse may ensue if the therapist errs by failing to be a
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blank slate and gratifying the patient’s transference wishes or
mismanaging the patient’s projections.
In his book, The Psychotherapeutic Impasse, Weiner (1982),
writing from the vantage of ego psychology, illustrates a section on
transference-related impasse with a case involving a woman seeking
treatment at the behest of her husband. Mrs. L’s husband is discouraged
by her strained relationship with his mother, and further wishes Mrs. L
to adopt his faith. The treatment never gets traction, though. Despite
the therapist’s efforts at free association, increasing the number of
sessions, and disclosing his countertransference attraction to the
patient, they are never able to move out of a stalled therapy.
After initially agreeing to end treatment, the patient becomes
angered. She doesn’t want termination and sues her therapist. Weiner
(1982) frames this scenario as a sort of negative therapeutic reaction,
whereby an intervention serves only to make the patient worse (Atwood,
Stolorow, & Trop, 1989). According to Weiner (1982), it is a case in
which, “the therapist colluded with Mrs. L’s transference wish to act
out her unconscious sadistic urges toward her parents in the form of
passive obstructionism with him” (p. 70). Weiner sees the same
“obstructionism” in her interactions with her mother-in-law and her
husband’s minister. He further understands that “her id had been
satisfied with the discharge of her sadistic impulses. Her superego and
ego were satisfied because her id impulses were adequately disguised by
their passive means of expression” (Weiner, 1982, p 70).
Weiner (1982) attributes the therapist’s failure to see clearly
this complex dynamic to his guilt over his attraction to her. This
interpretation could be construed as an effort to incorporate the
therapist’s countertransference into the case. But therapist and
patient continue to be held apart. Weiner does not appear curious about
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the ways in which therapist and patient, together, contribute to an
impasse dynamic. Furthermore, in his overall assessment of impasse,
Weiner characterizes it as a mistake. Thus not only is the impasse
itself problematic, but the therapist who finds himself in the midst of
one must contend with the ways in which he has erred to have landed
himself there in the first place.

Early Solutions
Prior to the 1990s, much of the literature on impasse was
prescriptive and generalizable. It seemed to suggest that only nominal
differences existed among impasse experiences. All that was needed to
find one’s way through was a straightforward diagnosis matched with its
corresponding prescription. Weiner (1982) provides a list of 10 “tools”
a therapist can utilize in diagnosing impasse. He follows with steps
for treating impasse, including interpretation, clarification,
confrontation, consultation, or transfer to another clinician. Reading
these remedies feels akin to discovering a metaphorical doctor’s bag
brimming with simple impasse cures.
In a classical rendering, the primary solution to impasse was
interpretation that made manifest the patient’s resistance (Darwin,
1999; Freud, 1914). Yet even Freud (1914) recognized that
interpretation may not be enough and could actually lead, at least
initially, to impasse. In “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through,”
Freud (1914) describes the disappointment of the beginning analyst who
points out a resistance to her analysand, only to find the resistance
intensified. Freud seems to suggest that interpretation is necessary,
but insufficient, for working through resistance and impasse.
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Toward a Contemporary Understanding of Impasse
By the early 1990s, the psychoanalytic depiction of impasse began
to change. The literature charts a gradual move from the view of
impasse as either a form of resistance in the patient or a sign of the
therapist’s failure to interpret this resistance, to one in which
impasse is intersubjective and expectable, though usually still
dramatic. A belief that impasse lay exclusively within the patient
began to give way to a shared focus on impasse as co-created by patient
and therapist (Benjamin, 2009; Harris, 2009).
The relational school has been especially active in broadening
this scope of inquiry. In keeping with a relational or intersubjective
stance, relational thinkers have attempted to account for the
subjectivities of both patient and analyst. By the late-90’s, Darwin
(1999) notes, “[Impasse] now capture[s] a moment when the transference
and the countertransference collude and/or collide” (p. 460). Infancy
studies have further widened this perspective. Empirical infant
research highlights the mutual regulation and rupture-repair cycles
between infants and their caregivers, which in turn have been extended
to an understanding of the exchanges between patients and analysts.
In his insightful paper, “Impasse Recollected,” Pizer (2004), a
relational analyst, summarizes a literature on the range of
contemporary ways in which impasse has been formulated. Similar to
Darwin’s (1999) description, there can be impasse as the collision of a
patient’s transference and a therapist’s vulnerabilities, as well as
impasse as the result of a dyad in which patient and therapist are
either too closely aligned or too divergent. Other formulations include
impasse as a failure of therapist and patient to recognize one
another’s subjectivities and communicate effectively intersubjectively;
impasse as a deadening nonrelating in the dyad; impasse as a dangerous
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reenactment or unexamined repetition; and impasse as a form of
dissociation on the part of either patient or therapist.
Each of these scenarios considers the analyst’s role in impasse
worthy of extended examination. As Benjamin (2009), a feminist
psychoanalyst, notes, contemporary theorists and clinicians are
increasingly open to accepting “the analyst’s role in contributing to
breakdown, rather than simply being the one responsible for repairing
it” (p. 442). No longer can we avoid the therapist’s contributions to
impasse. Nor should we desire to.
Interestingly, Darwin (1999) elucidates how, even in the late‘90s, impasse continued to be equated with failure. In highlighting the
risks--and risk taking--required of a therapist working through impasse
relationally, Darwin (1999) writes,
This way of working has created a new position for the
therapist who, for the sake of the treatment, leaps outside
the normal strictures of the frame and emerges either as the
hero who saves the day or the bad therapist who fails her
patient (p. 460).
The stakes are high and the blame has shifted, so that it was the
therapist’s failure alone:
The added inducement for therapists to heroically leap is
the change in perception…. Impasse used to be viewed
tacitly as a failing in the patient. It is now viewed,
implicitly and explicitly, as a failing on the therapist's
part (Darwin, 1999, p. 469).
Even as the general understanding of impasse became less punitive
and critical, the definition of impasse-as-deficiency tenaciously
found another foothold in the therapist.

Pizer’s Case: Dissociation
Pizer (2004), presenting a current case of impasse, conveys how
fraught the subject remains. He sets about unraveling what he calls a
more “subtle” (p. 291) impasse experience, organized around “weak
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dissociations” (p. 304). For the most part this treatment had been
successful and rewarding. Nonetheless, Pizer (2004) sets himself, the
therapist, the nearly impossible task of teasing out a sliver of
interaction that may seem mundane but is in fact pivotal, the very crux
of treatment:
It is just this sort of moment, often seemingly innocuous,
everyday, trivial--indeed, barely noticeable--that our next
choice negotiates a step that will move the treatment into
or out of impasse or perpetuate a subtle leitmotif of
impasse that maintains its familiar (that is, undetected)
grip in the relational field (p. 298).
Pizer (2004) goes on to recount his longtime work with one of his
first patients. Rebecca begins treatment in her early 20s and their
work together eventually spans nearly two decades. In the early stages,
within the context of a withholding and deteriorating family, Rebecca
is a volatile addict, highly dependent on Pizer who comes to suspect
her alcoholic father of sexual abuse. She is demanding, manipulative,
reckless, and frequently suicidal. Pizer finds himself accommodating
Rebecca’s dependency: he takes frequent phone calls between sessions,
accepts a low fee, and engages in occasional physical contact. This
phase of their work ends with Rebecca markedly stabilized, yet abruptly
ending treatment. Pizer comes to see that their early therapy was not
about narrative exploration. Instead, he acted as a sustaining and
holding environment for Rebecca. He concludes that he largely
“survived” (Pizer, 2004, p. 294) this stage of their treatment--the
import of which should not to be underestimated in navigating impasse.
Thirteen years later, Rebecca seeks out Pizer (2004) again,
apologizing for her behavior years earlier. She reveals that she
recovered memories of having been extensively sexually abused by her
father, which she reentered another therapy to work through. Rebecca
thanks Pizer, telling him that she had been unable to address the
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abuse--which Pizer (2004) describes as having been “nonnegotiable, or
impassable” (p. 295) between the two of them. “You did everything
right” Rebecca tells Pizer (2004). “You stood by me. I felt loved and
sheltered. You made it possible for me to stay alive long enough, until
I was ready to face the work I had to do” (p. 294).
About a year later, Rebecca asks to reenter therapy. Toward the
end of this five-year analysis, Pizer (2004) identifies the pivotal
exchange. Their encounter is wonderfully complex, holding all the
intricacy, muddle, and promise of impasse. Rebecca arrives to her final
session of the week breathless and late. She asks whether Pizer has
extra time at the end. He is torn. Knowing that he does have the time,
wanting to hold the frame, yet loathe to deny Rebecca so small a
request, Pizer (2004) replies, “Probably.” Rebecca then announces that
they will stop at their usual time, adding, “Good. Now I know. It's
excellent that I asked the question” (p. 297).
Pizer (2004) offers us a glimpse into the myriad thoughts running
through his mind in this moment: Does he comment on the exchange, which
seems so ripe, nudging their relationship into the fore? Or does he
allow Rebecca to go on with whatever she so pressingly needs to discuss
that day? His process brings me back to Behar’s photographer at the
Colombian mudslide, wavering between action and inaction.
Eventually Pizer (2004) does ask. He and Rebecca share with one
another what each had been grappling with internally during their
brief, four-sentence exchange. And with Rebecca’s reply, the entire
course of therapy shifts, moving them toward the start of termination:
Rebecca proceeded to elaborate, for herself and for me, her
own reflective formulation of the meaning of her
therapeutic and analytic experience with me over time. She
said, “I think I said we'd end at 10 partly to take care of
you--to spare you the tension and the struggle. But it's
more than that--more than just taking care of you. It's
also about my being a peer of yours and sharing the
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responsibility here for our relationship, and our
boundaries…. And of course there are moments when I want to
stay really little and have you be big and take care of me.
But we're also peers. I've thought of you as older, even
though you're not that much older. But I've needed to see
you as the one who's older … and takes care of me. But now
it's more like you're about five minutes older than me. And
I can take some responsibility between us. I mean--yes, I
need to be filled inside and surrounded on the outside by
peace and comfort--it's like twinning with people. But it's
a repetition--there's no growth in it. It's like turkey and
stuffing and gravy--it's the same every year for 48 years.
It's a comforting Thanksgiving ritual, but it never
changes. Three minutes of more time would be a repetition
of the same. And holding to the boundary means I can long
for more but choose otherwise. And I can help you choose-not just leave it up to you” (Pizer, 2004, pp. 299-300).
Rebecca’s commentary offers a window onto the artfully co-created,
intersubjective work that relational clinicians strive for.
Pizer (2004) uses her reflections to illustrate how easily we are
pulled into doing things as we have always done them, how impasse can
develop around simple inertia. By choosing one path--questioning
whether Rebecca might have been asking about more than just the time at
which their session would end--he creates the space for forward
movement and a deliberately articulated growth.
Yet Pizer’s (2004) central concern seems to be what might have
happened had he not asked? What course would their treatment have taken
if he had let himself be pulled into and carried through a familiar
enactment? By way of an answer, Pizer (2004) confesses,
I still can shudder when I think of how that threshold
moment with Rebecca might so easily have played out
differently. Embedded as I was in the weak dissociations of
our special and familiar kinship, I could so easily have
failed to inquire into the small detail of three minutes.
But impasse is often in the details (p. 304).
Certainly impasse does lie in the details as much as in the drama. But
I wonder, had Pizer not commented at this moment would there not have
been another? Must even the possibility of entertaining a “leitmotif of
impasse” (Pizer, 2004, p. 192) still induce one to shudder?
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Enactment
The notion of enactment evolved along lines similar to that of
impasse. In the broadest characterization, enactment is any relational
entanglement played out between patient and therapist (Ginot, 2009;
Renik, 2006). Yet like impasse, the term can encompass a range of
experiences. Aron (2003b) offers a definition that captures this
breadth: Enactment refers to “both the continual interactive dimension
of all psychoanalytic process and to special and unique incidences in
which unconscious variables are played out in either subtle or more
dramatic form between patient and analyst” (p. 627).
Instances of discrete, dramatic enactments include the startling
story of a patient who collapsed to the floor where he was joined by
his therapist, on whose shoulder he eventually ended up sobbing
(Davies, 2000), as well as the time another boldly let himself into his
therapist’s office, while it was still locked (M. Black, personal
communication, February 27, 2010). The idea of enactment as more
continuous describes a general and gradual pattern of interaction
flavored by a patient’s past relationships that unfolds over time.
Pizer (2004) understands Rebecca’s request for a longer session and his
response as an enactment. While her request represents a discrete
enactment, the interchange that unfolds is of the more gradual variety.
It both reenacts Rebecca’s earlier relational patterns as well as the
rhythms of relating that had developed between Pizer and Rebecca over
time.
Many relational therapists consider enactment inevitable, even
necessary, before truly meaningful work can begin (Darwin, 1999;
Davies, 1994). Some clinicians use the concepts of enactment and
impasse interchangeably (Ginot, 2009). Burnstein and Cheifetz (1999)
introduce the term “impasse enactments” (p. 74) to describe this
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relationship, while Stern (2003) defines impasse as a dramatic kind of
enactment. For the purposes of this paper, I will continue to consider
impasse and enactment as separate but entwined phenomena.

Rupture and Repair
As I now shift from a relational to an infant studies perspective
on impasse, it’s worth noting that these demarcations are somewhat
arbitrary. Relational thinkers have embraced the study of infancy just
as many of those conducting infant research do so from a vantage
informed by relational theory. Rupture and repair is one mode of
thinking that holds saliency for impasse but could as easily appear
under the rubric of relational theory as under the heading of infancy
studies. However, its utility for managing impasse, which can be
conceptualized as a failure to repair rupture, lies in the set of
nonverbal and procedural cues that pass back and forth between mother
and infant during times of rupture and subsequent repair.
The field of infancy research has extrapolated empirical findings
from observing mother-infant dyads to the therapist-patient
relationship. Benjamin (1995), a relational analyst steeped in the
study of infancy, elaborates the essential role that rupture and repair
play in early infant-caregiver interactions. “One of the main
principles of the early dyad,” Benjamin (1995) explains, “is that
relatedness is characterized not by continuous harmony but by
continuous disruption and repair” (p. 47). This non-harmonious but ever
reparative way of relating continues throughout the lifecycle.
An example of rupture and repair between a mother and child might
unfold as follows: A mother matches her baby’s squeals of delight with
hand clapping and an enthusiastic gaze. This moment of gleeful
attunement is ruptured when the infant becomes over-stimulated. Arching
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her back, she turns away from her mother, who continues to lean forward
and clap excitedly. The repair begins as the mother, recognizing her
baby’s discomfort, stops clapping and helps the infant re-regulate by
matching her less-engaged state. Soothed, the infant is able to resume
eye contact and the dyad moves forward, in sync once more (Walker,
2008). Infancy theorists postulate that much of this mutual recognition
and regulation goes on outside the conscious awareness of either
partner. Yet the ability to tune into unspoken modes of communicating
offers recourse in times of impasse.
Benjamin (1995) locates the mutuality of the mother-infant dyad
in the analyst and patient, emphasizing that, “The concept of mutual
recognition should include the notion of breakdown, of failure to
sustain that tension, as well as account for the possibility of repair
after failure” (p. 22). Within this framework, rupture becomes an
inescapable part of all relationships from infancy on, including the
treatment relationship. Thus, the rupture that constitutes impasse can
be considered normative. The emphasis lies on the ability of the
analyst to facilitate restoration and repair. Breakdown is viewed as
part of what allows the infant, or patient, to internalize an ability
to tolerate and regulate difficult emotions and learn to “transform
disconnection into reconnection” (Walker, 2008, p. 6).
We are able to repair the therapeutic relationship by tolerating
and working through the pain of rupture. This restoration holds until
the next impassable moment takes shape. Yet with each turn of the
cycle, the hope is that patient and therapist become better able to
withstand moments of impasse and more adept at reconnection (Benjamin,
2009; Maroda, 1999; Walker, 2008).
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Contemporary Solutions
In her paper tracing the changes in perception of impasse over
time, Darwin (1999) poses the question: “What is necessary and what is
sufficient to resolve impasse?” (p. 469).
Infancy theorists might offer that knowing these moments are
survivable is sufficient. Relational theorists might suggest that the
experience must be spoken--articulated and scrutinized besides being
enacted--in order for clinician and patient to grasp and make thinkable
their roles in the impasse dynamic. Hoffman (1999), a relational
analyst, calls for conscious verbal interpretation--not dissimilar from
a classical technique--to pull us through and make room for reflection:
At the very moment that he interprets, the analyst often
extricates himself as much as he extricates the patient… The
interpretation is “mutative” (Stratchy, 1934) partly because
it has a certain reflexive impact on the analyst himself
which the patient senses. Because it is implicitly selfinterpretive it modifies something in the analyst’s own
experience of the patient (p. 65).
Though from a truly relational position, what is thought to be
“mutative” is less the interpretation and more the space created for a
mutual pondering and being. By engaging the patient in shared
reflection, the analyst is valuing the patient’s ability to interpret,
understand, and empathize.
In exploring the “heroic” acts taken by relationally-oriented
clinicians to resolve impasse, Darwin (1999) makes an interesting
observation. She points to a symmetry in the therapists’ responses to
their patients: “Hoffman's patient acted a little crazy in the
colloquial sense and Hoffman acted a little crazy as well. Davies'
patient expressed his desire and she responded with her expression of
comparable desire” (p. 464). (Darwin, 1999) goes on,
To be effective, the intervention has to indicate to the
patient that resolving the impasse is as important to the
therapist as to the patient. Despite the inequity inherent
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in the fact that the patient has only one therapist while
the therapist has many patients, the therapist must show
parity of emotional investment (p. 469).
Perhaps what is therapeutic about impasse, then, is the way in which it
brings into relief and makes palpable the therapist’s all-in investment
in the relationship.

Summary
With the shift away from understanding impasse as a mistake--the
hallmark of a failed treatment, good for little more than causing the
patient unnecessary discomfort (Weiner, 1982)--has come a significant
recognition of the potential impasse holds for therapeutic growth and
change. There lie opportunities in the cracks in our relationships.
Relational analysts recommend we embrace impasse as vital and
indispensable. Ringstrom (1998) describes a treatment marked by not
one, but a series of impasses. He and his patient together bear the
feeling of “damned if I do, damned if I don’t.” In the end, Ringstrom
(1998) concludes, what they experienced were “essential impasses,
transformative in their resolution” (p. 315). Infancy researchers have
also shown how dyadic repair and survival can be curative, the
manifestation of a mutually constructed treatment tended to by both
therapist and patient.
The language used to depict the transformative potential of
impasse frequently involves a spatial metaphor. Whether described as
thirdness (Benjamin, 2009; Ogden, 1986), the liberating wingspread of
freedom and change (Pizer, 2004), standing in the spaces (Bromberg,
1996), mutually reflective space (Ginot, 2009), or additional space for
the therapist’s subjectivity (Beebe, Knoblauch, Rustin, & Sorter,
2005), this language articulates a powerful and promising new expanse.
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In the murky encounters with strong affect, difficult enactments,
and painful rupture as well as the muddling through less eventful, more
habitual aspects of the therapeutic encounter, lies hope. The work of
therapy is a constant negotiation and renegotiation, sticking and unsticking. At times we must stand still, or even step backward, before
we can move through. Because really, it is all impasse.
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CHAPTER III
TOWARD A RELATIONAL THEORY OF IMPASSE

Relationality is what defines us.
--Stephen A. Mitchell, Relationality: From Attachment to
Intersubjectivity
At heart, relational theory is discursive, a meta-theory pulling
from and building upon the psychoanalytic traditions that came before
it. Beneath the relational umbrella, schools whose perspectives had
been treated as irreconcilable--notably ego psychology, Kleinian
theory, and British object relations--were integrated and brought into
conversation. Among others, the relational model has drawn heavily from
object relations and interpersonal theory, both dating back to the
1950s (Mitchell & Black, 1995), as well as contemporary self psychology
and intersubjective theory (Benjamin, 1995).
The beginning of the relational movement was marked by the 1983
publication of Jay Greenberg and Stephen Mitchell’s Object Relations in
Psychoanalytic Theory. Greenberg and Mitchell coined the term
“relational” (Mitchell & Aron, 1999, p. xvii) to describe a group of
theorists who had replaced the traditional emphasis on libidinal and
aggressive drives with a focus on relational needs. While Greenberg and
Mitchell viewed their psychoanalytic approach as an “alternative”
(Mitchell & Aron, 1999, p. xiii) to the classical drive model, some
critics have argued that this distinction actually creates a false
dichotomy between the two theories (Mills, 2005).
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Benjamin (1995), a relational analyst, perhaps captures the
relational movement best with her pithy and discursive play on Freud’s
(1933), “Where id was, ego must be” (p. 79). In suggesting, “Where
objects are, subjects must be” (p. 29), Benjamin (1995) modifies
Freud’s explication of the role psychoanalysis plays in mediating the
different structures of mind. Instead, she proposes, analysis can
mediate our way of relating to one another.
The American relational tradition coalesced in the mid-1990s
around a group of psychoanalytic clinicians and scholars trained in
feminism, sociology, philosophy, and anthropology. Postmodernism was in
ascendency, and constructivism advanced the questioning of longstanding
psychoanalytic tenets, such as the analyst’s objectivity and
abstinence, the rigidity of the frame, and the feasibility of extending
a single theory of mind to a wide range of people (Mills, 2005). As a
result, within a relational framework, the analyst is no longer
considered the expert, context is of vital importance, universals are
believed to be rare, and meaning is thought to be shaped by the
interpersonal realm in which it comes into being (D. Stern, personal
communication, December 5, 2009).
In his tribute to Stephen Mitchell, the psychoanalyst regarded as
the principle founder of the relational school, Aron (2003a) notes
Mitchell’s skill for finding a third way--“an alternative reconciling
the tension between the first two” (p. 273)--whether among seemingly
disparate theoretical orientations, or in conflicting approaches to a
clinical impasse. The same dialectical approach has been said to
characterize the larger relational movement, and its attempts to
support the tension between internal and external, intrapsychic and
interpersonal, past and present, fantasy and reality.
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As an analytic theory of mind, the roots of the relational model
lie in a Freudian understanding of the primacy of the unconscious, the
patient’s resistance to uncomfortable desires, the significance of
fantasy, transference toward the analyst, and the persistent residue of
the patient’s past. While classical analytic technique calls for a
withholding analyst to frustrate the patient, leaving the analyst’s own
subjectivity outside the consulting room, a relational approach shifts
the locus of work. Rather than a primarily intrapsychic focus on the
patient, it creates space for the interpersonal, though the two remain
entwined. As Mitchell (2000) describes it,
Interpersonal relational processes generate intrapsychic
relational processes which reshape interpersonal processes
reshaping intrapsychic processes, on and on in an endless
Möbius strip in which internal and external are perpetually
regenerating and transforming themselves and each other (p.
57).
Both participants in the analysis and the way in which they
interact become relevant to a treatment that pivots on the dynamic and
reciprocal, though asymmetrical, relationship between patient and
practitioner. According to Mitchell (2000), “In the broad sea change in
the ways in which the analytic process is now understood and
envisioned, the analytic relationship, the personal relationship
between the two participants, is now granted a fundamental,
transformative role” (p. 64). A relational approach places considerably
greater emphasis on the present than does classical analysis.
Particular attention is given to the way relational patterns learned in
the past become lived and enacted in the therapeutic relationship. This
acknowledgement and exploration of the conscious, present moment
interaction of patient and analyst as a device for and site of change
stands among the most significant breaks from classical technique.
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Relational Theory and Impasse
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, relational thinkers are among
those most interested in the phenomenon of impasse. Clinicians working
relationally have been at the forefront of shifting the spotlight of
impasse from patient to a shared illumination of the patient-therapist
dyad and, more recently, clinician alone. This can be seen reflected in
the literature. Over a hundred papers in which analysts relay some
experience with clinical impasse have been published in the relational
journal Psychoanalytic Dialogues since its launch in 1991.
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, as I consider what a
relational framework offers an understanding of impasse, transferencecountertransference dynamics particularly as seen through the
phenomenon of enactment figure prominently.

Countertransference and Enactment
While Freud (1905) eventually came to view transference as
something that “cannot be evaded” (p. 116), he continued to hold that
countertransference--in his estimation a sign of the analyst’s
unresolved conflicts--should be (Chodorow, 1999). Enactment, first
described as such in the mid-1980s, received similar treatment (Renik,
2006). At the time, clinicians were trained to avoid enactments. If
enactment did slip into treatment, the analyst was to control for
damage and make the experience as therapeutically useful as possible.
Renik (2006) and others (Suchet, 2004) have critiqued this view for
converting enactment into a euphemism for what was previously and
pejoratively called acting out.
Contemporary formulations of countertransference and enactment
are considerably more expansive--both in terms of what is viewed as
part of these phenomena as well as how they may be of therapeutic use.
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Beyond the analyst’s thoughts and feelings about the patient or
therapy, countertransference can include the therapist’s dissociation,
missatunement, or defensiveness

(Benjamin, 2009). To a relational way

of thinking, the essential question may not be so much what makes up
countertransference, but rather: What is not countertransference?
Renik (2006) argues for taking a similar stance with enactment-defined in the previous chapter as an entanglement played out, or
enacted, between patient and therapist. He believes that enactment
should no longer describe “particular events that sometimes occur in
treatment, but a constant dimension of all treatment events” (Renik,
2006, p. 91). Though I examine more discrete moments of enactment,
Renik’s thinking is in keeping with a relational approach. It also
underscores one of the major premises of this project: That
countertransference, enactment, and impasse cannot “be minimized, let
alone eliminated, from analytic treatment” (Renik, 2006, p. 91). They
should not be considered obstacles, but rather equally a part of
“unproductive” as well as “productive interactions between patient and
analyst”(Renik, 2006, p. 91).
Like impasse, moments of enactment can leave a patient and
therapist feeling precariously entangled, or else vastly apart (Ginot,
2009). What enactment does, however, is allow us in. As clinicians we
enter the experience of the patient, able to get a little further
inside the patient’s internal object world (Benjamin, 2009; Bridges,
2005; Darwin, 1999). And often what relational clinicians discover is
that there are experiences and feelings impossible to verbalize or
express in any other way (Ginot, 2009). Because of this, a number of
contemporary theorists argue that enactment--which for some is
interchangeable with impasse--is a necessary part of the treatment
process. Clinicians embracing this thinking believe enactment
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unconsciously alerts the therapist to the necessity of engaging with a
previously unknown aspect of the patient (Bromberg, 2003). Davies
(1994) explains,
We assume--indeed, we rely upon--the hope that analyst and
patient together will become enmeshed in complicated
reenactments of early, unformulated experiences with
significant others that can shed light upon the patient’s
current interpersonal and intrapsychic difficulties by
reopening in the analytic relationship prematurely
foreclosed areas of experience (p. 156).
Davies (1994) goes on to say, “The analytic space provides the backdrop
against which previously foreclosed experiences can be reopened,
mastered, and more effectively integrated within an internal system
that no longer views such moments as overwhelming and dangerous” (p.
157). This might be described as a repetition compulsion model of
enactment, whereby the patient uses therapy to belatedly master a past
relational difficulty (M. Stark, personal communication, March 28,
2009).
Within enactment tinged by repetition, the patient may become,
for example, a traumatizing parent and the therapist a traumatized
child, or vice versa. M. Stark (personal communication, March 28,
2009), a psychoanalyst informed by relational theory, understands that
it can be too painful for the patient to have a relational encounter
unfold in any way other than how it had in the past. To do so would
mean the patient’s earlier relationships could have been different as
well. The impasse, then, provides an opportunity for the patient to
achieve mastery, a transformative reworking.

Davies’ Case: Enactment in Therapeutic Action
Perhaps the most iconic representation--and one of the more
controversial--of a contemporary, relational understanding of impasse,
in which enactment plays a prominent role, is Davies (1994) paper “Love
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in the Afternoon.” Davies comes to understand the impasse that develops
between herself and her young male patient as the result of an
enactment recalling his erotic relationship with his mother. His mother
was overtly seductive toward Mr. M, yet became punitive and rejecting
if ever he responded to her advances (Darwin, 1999).
In treatment, Mr. M has repeated a pattern of fantasizing erotic
relationships with the women he encounters, but imagining himself too
unattractive and weak to ever have his feelings reciprocated. He has
shared with Davies (1994) a highly erotic transference, relaying sexual
fantasies involving Davies that she describes as “almost poetic” (p.
163). But in the next breath he invariably becomes self-loathing,
declaring it impossible that his feelings could ever be shared.
Davies (1994) eventually chooses to disclose to Mr. M her own
erotic feelings toward him. She believes it is the only way for him to
know that he alone has not created the sexual undercurrent in the room
--in the same way that his childhood feelings were not his alone. Just
as Mr. M finds himself attracted to Davies, she, too, feels attraction
for and fantasizes about him.
Initially, Mr. M is horrified and furious at the
countertransference revelation. He threatens to sue, insisting that
Davies (1994) has overstepped a boundary. But later he comes to
understand--in a way interpretation had not been able to convey--that
his mother may have struggled with her own erotic feelings for him. He
can begin to entertain the possibility that it was her own shame, not
anything wrong or repulsive in him, which his mother was responding to.
Davies revelation allows the impasse, in this case the repetition, to
shift.
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Managing Impasse Relationally
So how do we manage? The relational literature suggests leaning
into impasse. The clinician cannot conduct a perfect treatment, but can
acknowledge disruptions and continually engage in the process of
discussing and rectifying these rifts.
Benjamin (2009) insists that therapists take responsibility for
their failures, whether the result of dissociation, lapses, or personal
vulnerabilities. Clinicians must give up the fantasy of being a
“complete container” (Benjamin, 2009, p. 442) and instead submit to
knowing that at times we will cause pain, hurt, even harm. In place of
this fantasy, we avail ourselves of the dyad’s ability to withstand:
“The idea that both participants in the analytic dyad survive--or
perhaps more properly said come back to life subsequent to--the other’s
failure is the principle to which an analyst needs recourse during
impasse and lesser breakdowns” (Benjamin, 2009, p. 442). Recognizing
and enduring impasse can be excruciatingly difficult and near
impossible in the moment. At times, the best we can do is wait for the
next session or the right time in order to open what has transpired to
conversation (Benjamin, 2009).

Mitchell’s Cases
Aron (2003a) locates Mitchell’s genius for “navigating clinical
stalemates” (p. 273) in his creativity, transparency, and patience:
When dealing with therapeutic impasses, Mitchell learned to
tolerate, sustain, and identify the entrapped states in
which he found himself until he could free his imagination
and gradually discover some third avenue along which to
proceed (p. 273).
Often this involved Mitchell bringing his patient into his process,
letting her know how trapped he felt by the only apparent options.
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Mitchell (2000) describes one such impasse with Helen, a
corporate executive who brings her explosive anger to treatment. They
alternate between periods of working together successfully and times
when Helen becomes so furious she storms out of treatment. Mitchell, in
turn, vacillates between warm and loving feelings and strong
frustration and anger. Finally, after one of her rageful outbursts,
Helen taunts: “I know you are hating me. Why don’t you just come out
and say it. Look, if we were out on the street, if this weren’t an
analytic relationship, what would you say to me right now?” Mitchell
(2000), feeling trapped, responds, “If this were not an analytic
relationship, if this were out on the street and you were talking to me
this way and I weren’t your analyst, I probably would say ‘FUCK YOU!’
But I am your analyst” (p. 142). They both end up laughing.
What finally moves Mitchell and Helen out of their interactive
pattern--their impasse--is their ability to straddle two spaces at
once. Mitchell (2000) understands their interaction on multiple levels:
She had somehow managed to risk confronting me fully with
her hatred while, at the same time, suggesting a kind of
transitional space, in the imagined confrontation in the
street, in which we might play it out. I had somehow
managed to find a way to express my rage and, at the same
time, to signal to her that I was not unmindful of my
responsibility to take care of her and the process, of
which I was the guardian (p. 142).
Mitchell (2000) is able to hold two roles, and let Helen into his
feelings about each. He responds authentically as himself, but remains
aware of his position as the analyst. He is both in the experience and
able to reflect on it.
In recounting another case--his work with Becky, a 30-year-old
history graduate student in her fifth year of treatment--Mitchell
(2000) describes an impasse that results from a reenactment of her
interactions with her parents:
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She had expressed considerable anger at me. I had been
missing how much trouble she was having, she claimed.
Perhaps I was misled by her apparent success at school, not
noticing how depressed and anxious she often felt about how
blocked she was in the papers she was supposed to be
writing…. I thought there was some truth to Becky’s
charge…. We explored some of the ways in which she and I
had recently been drifting…along into a joint created sense
of complacence regarding her external successes (p. 71).
Theirs is an experience not unlike the lulling, dissociated repetitions
described by Pizer (2004). Mitchell and Becky find a way out not
through interpretation, but rather the shared, lived experience of
dialogic exchange. They begin talking about her writing projects,
something she was not able to do with her parents. As a result,
Mitchell (2000) writes, “I felt we had managed to cocreate the kind of
experience she had never had with her parents, whose narcissistic
concerns and investments made an enjoyment of Becky’s own creativity
either irrelevant or too threatening” (p. 72). Mitchell does not dwell
on their impasse, but rather heeds what Becky says she needs from him.

Summary
Among relational clinician writing on impasse, one consensus
seems to be that often--though not always--these moments can be
resolved through verbal communication (Davies, 1994; Ginot, 2009;
Maroda, 1999; Mitchell, 2000; Renik, 2006; M. Stark, personal
communication, March 28, 2009). This frequently requires some form of
self-disclosure. Maroda (1999) outlines how,
Often the road to reconciliation and reconnection following
inevitable ruptures or mutual negations involves the use of
self-disclosure. Each person admits his or her feelings,
differences are aired, and attempts are made at
understanding and forgiving. Once again the relationship is
repaired even though each person knows that eventually it
will be ruptured anew. And they cycle continues. Without
the use of self-disclosure we have no method of adequately
exploring this deep and complicated relational pattern (p.
488).
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Disclosure is admittedly a complex undertaking, whether it takes the
shape of revealing shared feelings, as Davies (1994) did; acknowledging
and surviving the therapist’s failures, like Benjamin (2009)
recommends; or Mitchell’s (2000) revelation of feeling trapped.
Benjamin (2009) explains the power of such transparency: “Such action
is meant to show that the analyst can change, can model the
transformational process, and that revealing her struggle to do so also
transforms the analytic process into one of mutual listening to
multiple voices” (p. 450). By choosing self-disclosure, the therapist
conveys to the patient a willingness and ability to survive,
acknowledge, and explore her participation in impasse (Ginot, 2009).
M. Stark (personal communication, March 28, 2009) suggests that
one way of opening up impasse for conversation is by acknowledging the
necessity of enactment, particularly in light of the therapist’s
inability to initially recognize some piece of the patient’s
experience. Like Renik (2006), Stark believes in respectfully framing
the patient’s activities not as acting out, but rather as a necessary
communication.
Does this mean that had the therapist been listening harder or
hearing more clearly, the patient would not have had to resort to
enactment or impasse in order to be understood? Relational analysts
surmise there may actually be no other way for a patient to make
certain experiences, including trauma, understood (Schore, 2002). If
not drawn into participating with the patient, the therapist may be
missing an opportunity for knowing a part of the patient.
In the previous chapter, Darwin (1999) conveyed the importance of
the therapist’s investment in the relationship. We must first allow
ourselves to be pulled into the messiness, into an enactment, in order
to be able to get back out. The therapist’s willingness and
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availability to impasse communicates empathy, while the effort to
reflect on and work through impasse in conversation with the patient
signals a commitment to the therapy (Ginot, 2009). If this can be done
effectively, “Together therapist and patient rework the patient’s
narrative and rewrite the patient’s story”(Ganzer, 2007, p. 118).
Relational theorists have suggested that meaning is not only discovered
but also created (Leary, 1995; Mills, 2005), a notion that holds
especially true of the meaning that emerges from impasse.

35

CHAPTER IV
TOWARD AN INFANCY RESEARCH THEORY OF IMPASSE

Psychoanalysis is not “the talking cure,” but more precisely “the
communicating cure.”
--Allan Schore, Affect Regulation and the Repair of the Self
In the previous chapter I considered a relational approach to
impasse, one that often calls for verbal communication between analyst
and patient. But what happens when talking is not enough? Or spoken
narrative is not possible? In this chapter, I turn to nonverbal
communication, another avenue for navigating impasse as elucidated by
infancy studies, an offshoot of attachment theory.
Though they developed in parallel, mainstream mid-20th century
psychoanalysis initially rejected attachment theory. As a result of his
behavioral approach and concern with adaptation to the real world,
British psychoanalyst John Bowlby’s ideas were considered too material
and mechanistic, better suited to research than analysis (Mitchell,
1999). Mitchell suggests that the intrapsychic model of Freudian and
Kleinian drive theory left little room for concern with lived
relationships. Bowlby, on the other hand, centered his work on the real
relationship between mother and child. In 1980, Bowlby wrote:
Intimate attachments to other human beings are the hub
around which a person’s life revolves, not only when he is
an infant or a toddler or a school child but throughout his
adolescence and his years of maturity as well, and on into
old age (Mitchell, 1999, pp. 90-91).
While Bowlby’s placement of human relationships at the center of
his work posed a challenge to the psychoanalysis of his day, today it
has moved him into the pantheon of the precursors to the relational
movement (Mitchell, 1999). In fact, relational psychoanalysts have
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deemed empirical infant studies--with roots in the attachment work of
Bowlby and American psychologist Mary Ainsworth (Shilkret & Shilkret,
2008)--the contemporary body of work currently having the greatest
impact on psychoanalytic ideas (Harris, 1997).

The Study of Infancy
Analysts initially looked to infant research as a means of
helping deepen their understanding of their patients’ early childhoods.
Now a more explicit connection is being drawn between the interaction
of infant-caregiver and patient-analyst. Beebe, Knoblauch, Rustin, and
Sorter (2003) hypothesize that the preverbal communication of infants
corresponds with nonverbal and implicit communication in adults, most
of which occurs outside conscious awareness. The basic process of this
nonverbal communication remains consistent, though not identical,
across the lifespan (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002). As a result, the
empirical work of infancy studies can be extrapolated to patient and
analyst interactions in treatment. Clinicians working off an infancy
framework are able to call on a variety of methods beyond the spoken
word for engaging their patients. These include implicit behavioral and
procedural modes of interaction.
A shift in the study of infancy occurred in the 1970s. As in the
relational field, where the dyad became the primary area of inquiry,
infant researchers began to focus not only on the caregiver’s impact on
the infant, but on the bidirectional, mutual flow of influence between
the two. Lachmann (2001), a psychoanalyst, describes this as the “era
of the constructionist infant, the infant coconstructing its world in
interaction with its environment” (p. 168). Beebe (Beebe & Lachmann,
2002), a psychoanalyst and infant researcher, movingly captures both
the infant’s responsiveness and influence as she describes the
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encounter that cemented her decision to study mother-infant
reciprocity:
I remember
whose face
responding
my eyes. I
and by her

one particular day when I played with a baby
was full of joy. As I watched her face
to mine, going up and up and up, tears came to
was so moved by how closely she tracked my face
bursting into a sunbeam (p.3)

While the baby’s sunbeam is a joyful response to Beebe, it is clear
that the baby also exerts a powerful effect on Beebe.
Infant researchers suggest that even newborns have the innate
ability to be in sympathetic communication with their caretakers, with
“each aware of the other's feelings and purposes without words and
language, by matching communicative expressions through time, form, and
intensity” (Beebe, Rustin, Sorter, & Knoblauch, 2003, p. 812).
Empirical research has elucidated the subtle, nonconscious dance of
mutual engagement, disengagement, and reengagement that occurs in the
early dyad. A similar sequence can be observed in the consulting room,
where both patient and therapist hold sway over the steps and turns
that are taken in the course of treatment (Beebe & Lachmann, 1998).

Nonverbal Communication: Correspondence and Elaboration
Among the forms of preverbal interaction identified in infancy
studies are matching, or corresponding, with the other. The notion of
correspondence is consistent with the way therapists relate to their
patients. By matching a patient’s expressions and nonverbal states, the
therapist can “communicat[e] to the other a feeling of ‘being with’… a
fundamental ingredient of intimacy” (Beebe, Rustin, et al., 2003, p.
809). Yet infancy researchers note that a mother rarely exactly
replicates her baby’s affect or behavior, but rather elaborates upon
them. Similarly, by elaborating on what a patient has expressed, the
therapist is able to widen the range of affect and experience available

38

to the dyad, as well as help the patient regulate distress. On
occasion, a therapist may try a true matching, more closely aligning
herself with the patient, being with the patient in whatever she is
feeling--what Stern calls “sharing without altering” (Beebe et al.,
2005, p. 135).
By way of example of the escalation that can occur during a
faithful and unmindful correspondence, Beebe (Beebe, Rustin, et al.,
2003) describes the problematic mutual escalation of infant and
caretaker. As the infant becomes more distressed, her caretaker does as
well: “Each partner then proceeds to match the other's increasing
arousal and distress, each topping the other, going up and up and up,
until the infant disorganizes, perhaps by vomiting (at four months) or
screaming (at 12 months)”(Beebe, Rustin, et al., 2003, pp. 819-820).
Using Shakespeare’s Othello and Desdemona, Beebe illustrates a
similarly distressed and dysregulated adult exchange. Both characters
are so preoccupied with the content of their discussion that neither is
able to grasp what is happening on a procedural level or attend to
self- or mutual-regulation. They are at cross-purposes: Othello
anguished over a possible affair between Desdemona and Casio, and
Desdemona guilelessly pressing her case for Casio’s return to Othello’s
army. The conversation escalates until neither lover can reassure the
other, and Othello storms off stage. Their impasse ends unresolved, to
say the least, with both lovers dead by the end of the play.
Done deliberately and with care, however, Beebe (Beebe, Rustin,
et al., 2003) shows how matching negative states can be used as a form
of distress regulation. She soothes 17-month-old Dan by remaining
attuned and sympathetic to his responses, joining his dampened state:
Dan suddenly became completely still, collapsing tonus with
his head down. The stranger became similarly still and
waited. After half a minute, Dan looked up from under his
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brows, with his head still partially down. The stranger
very softly said, “Hello, it's okay.” Dan then looked down
again, and became motionless. Dan and the stranger cycled
through this pattern many times over, for about two and a
half minutes. Then, as suddenly as it came, it went, and
Dan emerged partially smiling and gradually resumed play
with the stranger (Beebe, Rustin, et al., p. 820).
Beebe, Rustin, et al. (2003) describes a similar, nonconscious
matching of a distressed state in the psychoanalytic treatment of an
adult patient. The therapist connects to her by reproducing the rhythms
of the patient’s whimpers and cries:
The patient was increasingly distressed, speaking tensely,
gesturing rapidly with her hands, her torso leaning forward
tautly, her face screwed into a precry. The analyst was
silently listening, his face very attentive. As the
patient's agitation began, the analyst slightly shifted the
orientation of his chair toward the patient. Both
maintained continuous eye contact. As the agitation
mounted, the analyst's foot made intermittent brief, rapid
jiggles, matching the rhythm of the patient's body. He then
moved slightly forward in his chair. At this point the
heads of both analyst and patient went up in a synchronous
movement. At each escalation of the patient's agitation,
the analyst participated, crossing and uncrossing his legs
and nodding his head up and down in rhythm with the
patient's movements and each time saying “Yes,” softly.
Gradually the patient began to calm down; the analyst's
head movements became slower. There were several long
moments of silence. Then slowly they began to speak to each
other… (Beebe, Rustin, et al., 2003, p. 832).
The researchers clarify that what the therapist matches is not
the intensity of the patient’s arousal, but the shifts in her
arousal. By matching in this way, the therapist is able to convey
that he is attuned and with his patient. I wonder, too, whether
once the therapist was able to connect on an implicit level, if
he began to slow and calm his movements as a way to help sooth
the patient.
Beebe, Rustin, et al. (2003) suggest that correspondence in
pleasure is one area of the infancy domain that has not been adequately
picked up by adult psychoanalysis, where the emphasis remains on
differentiation and conflict. Matching positive states can be critical
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for sharing in the successes of treatment, facilitating the therapeutic
alliance and a secure attachment (Beebe et al., 2005), as well as
moving out of an impasse.

Rupture and Repair
In addition to forms of corresponding, we see in both
infant/caregiver and patient/therapist dyads the ongoing dialectics of
rupture, or disruption, and repair; attunement and missattunement;
engagement and disengagement. If we take as a given that these
experiences are normative, we can then turn our attention to repair,
re-attunement, and reengagement. The good enough caregiver whose infant
becomes distressed in the face of her missattunment is able refocus and
re-attune, thus helping regulate the infant (Schore, 2002). In adult
treatment, “The goal is the restoration of recognition after its
breakdown, which includes re-establishing the tension between
differences and sameness, negation and recognition. Such restoration
increases the patient's sense of agency and ability to contain pain and
loss” (Beebe, Knoblauch, et al., 2003, pp. 761-762).

Benjamin’s Case: A Bridge Between Relational Theory and Infancy Studies
In a recent paper, Benjamin (2009), whose work draws heavily on
infancy studies, relays an impasse that occurred toward the end of a
long analysis. Employing a contemporary relational approach, Benjamin
(2009) turns the spotlight onto her own role in a therapy that becomes
“lock[ed]-in” (p. 442). She shifts from viewing the analyst as solely
responsible for repairing rupture to examining how she helped create
the rift in the first place. Benjamin discovers that through her
insistence on reassuring her patient, Hannah, whenever she berated
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herself, that she was neglecting to truly acknowledge and accept
Hannah’s “bad” self.
Benjamin (2009) readily admits to having failed to completely
contain Hannah’s “shame and persecution” (p. 448). Yet she does not
view this disruption--or the impasse that ensues--as a true failure.
She and Hannah are able to strengthen and restore their relationship
through dialogic repair. The therapist’s failure to contain, manage,
and metabolize does not necessitate collapse: “What usually solidifies
and makes intractable re-traumatization in the analytic dyad is not the
enactment itself but the analyst’s failure to acknowledge, which the
patient correctly grasps as the avoidable failure” (Benjamin, 2009, p.
444). The harm a patient experiences is not owing to impasse, but the
failure to acknowledge and work through it.
Benjamin (2009) and others (M. Stark, personal communication,
March 28, 2009) note that breakdowns in the treatment relationship can
be especially common when the work moves to an examination of trauma,
where there may be “unlinked self-parts” (Benjamin, 2009, p. 443).
Benjamin (2009) further “emphasize[s] that our ‘failure’ to link is
inevitable…and not the failure it feels like” (p. 443). So impasse does
not necessarily take shape as failure, after all.

Relevance to Impasse
If impasse is conceptualized as a communication breakdown
(Maroda, 1999), then one way to reopen communication is on the
procedural, nonverbal level: “When language fails, the psychoanalytic
dyad can still have access to prelinguistic and implicit forms of
communicative competence and intersubjectivity”

(Beebe, Rustin, et

al., 2003, p. 813). Schore (2009) further emphasizes that the primary
process, right-brain to right-brain, nonverbal communication of the
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infant and caregiver is the predominant form of communication when
patient and therapist are caught in stressful clinical situations.
In describing the process of what occurs in the patient-analyst
relationship--rather than simply the content of what is discussed-infancy studies can expand the ways in which impasse is understood and
managed (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002). Of particular relevance are the
assorted nonverbal domains that infancy theorists attend to in their
research and clinical practice. After all, “An intersubjective field is
more than just an interaction of two minds, but also of two bodies”
(Schore, 2009, p. 133). Implicit communication can be conveyed through
visual means, such as facial configurations and expressions; through
the physical dimensions of touch, posture, gesture, and movement; and
through auditory elements, including the prosodoy of vocalization
(Beebe, Knoblauch, et al., 2003; Schore, 2009).

Beebe’s Case: Early Trauma
Through her work with Dolores, over the course of a ten-year
analysis, Beebe (Beebe, et al., 2005) demonstrates the use of infant
research in adult treatment. Dolores is articulate and eloquent, a
successful and sociable biology professor. But she shuts down, losing
language as the treatment moves deeper into her early trauma and loss.
Until age 5, when Dolores was adopted by a third family, she was
emotionally, physically, and sexually abused as she shuttled back and
forth between an abusive biological mother and a loving foster mother.
A feeling of impasse immediately sets in. From the start, Beebe
(Beebe et al., 2005) recalls, “[Dolores] longed for an attachment to
me, and yet she could not look at me, and often could not talk” (p.
95). Beebe struggles to connect with her deeply disturbed and
dissociated patient. What eventually opens up the treatment is Beebe’s
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decision to reconfigure their seating. She situates her chair at a
right angle to Dolores, with a small table between them, at a distance
that approximates “that of usual adult face-to-face interaction…closer
than usual face-to-face psychotherapy, but not as close as that between
mother and infant” (Beebe et al., 2005, p. 104). In doing so, Beebe
attends to the physical, their orientation, making herself more
immediately present when Dolores enters a state of dissociation.
Beebe (Beebe et al., 2005) sustains the treatment through
additional nonverbal modes of interaction and connection. At various
points, Beebe matches Dolores’ sounds, rhythm, and breath. She mirrors
Dolores’ head and body orientation and gaze. Beebe also discovers that
without realizing it, her movements and facial expressions have
corresponded to Dolores’ dampened state. Much of this, Beebe
acknowledges, occurs outside of her awareness, made available to her
only as she reviews detailed videotapes of the sessions.
A second impasse sets in when Dolores discovers that Beebe (Beebe
et al., 2005) is in a relationship with a man. For Dolores, this
revelation recalls her lost and beloved foster mother. Her mother was
with a man the last time Dolores saw her, and on some level Dolores
believes he was responsible for taking her mother away. The enactment
ruptures their fragile connection. Dolores describes the same feeling
of being “kicked out” (Beebe et al., 2005, p. 115) with Beebe that she
experienced with her mother as a small child. She hardly speaks to
Beebe through six months of treatment. Part of what helps them move
through this period is disclosure. Beebe (Beebe et al., 2005) recalls,
Slowly I came to terms with the idea that this theme had to
emerge, that it would have happened sooner or later, and
that it would be essential to her recovery. I also
acknowledged to her that some of our difficulty was coming
from something in me, something from my own childhood, that
had been re-evoked (p. 115).
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Dolores accepts Beebe’s acknowledgement of partial responsibility
and they are able to again move forward.
During the fifth year of treatment, Dolores describes the
difference between her experience with Beebe (Beebe et al., 2005) and
with Sally, her previous therapist, who was presumably less attuned to
the nonverbal domain:
You accepted it, what my feelings were, or what my face was
or offered--you met it. You felt impacted or changed by it.
Not like Sally. With Sally it was about my unconscious
exerting a pressure on her to feel a certain something, and
what did that say about me. It wasn’t about “me and you,”
the way it is here (p. 122).
It seems Sally relied on verbal interpretation, and a more classical
understanding of transference-countertransference and possibly impasse.
In reflecting on what went on between herself and Dolores, Beebe
describes much that was unspoken: her self-soothing gestures--sighing,
cradling her face, rubbing her feet together--as they met Dolores’ own
self-soothing--her need to wear sunglasses during the transition into
each therapy session and a very still body. Minute, implicit
adjustments, which Beebe says she learned from working with infants,
shade the interplay between Beebe and Dolores.
In identifying what was reparative for Dolores, Beebe highlights
Dolores’ slow realization that she could impact Beebe as Beebe could
impact her, something she had never truly felt before. Dolores
recognizes that her pain impacts Beebe, who seeks to comfort her, which
Dolores, in turn, experiences as comforting.
After ten years of therapy, Dolores still struggles. But she is
more engaged with Beebe, better able to gaze at Beebe and be gazed at
by Beebe. She speaks more and is more audible when she does talk. Beebe
notes, too, that her own sense of hypervigilance while with Dolores has
diminished, and she has returned to her more normal range of movement,
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affect, and vocalization as Dolores’ tolerance expanded. Outside the
consulting room, Dolores has moved deeper into relationship with her
new boyfriend and is more connected at work and with friends.

Summary
Looking back on his work as a young therapist, Pizer (2004), the
relational analyst discussed in previous chapters, wistfully laments
what may have been lost as he moved into a more mature, experienced,
and integrated analytic self. Early on, he feels he intuitively tapped
into, “The embodied origins of early psychological life based in
biological and physical necessities and grounded in the enactive
experience of holding, object presenting, affect attunement, and
recognition that provide for procedural patterns of being, selfregulating, and relating” (Pizer, 2004, p. 303). Pizer is, of course,
describing just the sort of nonverbal awareness and attunement that are
the purview of infancy studies.
Meanwhile, after her lengthy work with Dolores and careful
deconstruction of the nonverbal arenas of their interaction, almost as
a footnote, Beebe describes how much of the early, non-narrative work
set the stage for later, explicit mourning. Dolores must come to accept
that her good foster mother was also the abandoning mother. This split
is eventually bridged through words and interpretation: “The nonverbal
and implicit relatedness created the foundation of the treatment, but
it would not have been sufficient for the treatment to flower,” writes
Beebe (Beebe et al., 2005, p. 141).
As treatment and healing progressed, Beebe relays that the
nonverbal elements of their work drifted into the background and became
better incorporated with the verbal. What Pizer (2004) and Beebe (Beebe
et al., 2005) are each calling attention to is the need for
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integration: We must have access to multiple realms--the spoken
narrative as well as nonverbal ways of knowing.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

The Case of Bee

As I now turn to my own work, I hope to show, through a clinical
vignette, how relational theory and infancy research can be synthesized
to reconceptualize impasse.

An Introduction
My early experience with impasse was baffling. Only later, as I
sat with it, read about it, and discussed it, was I able to make some
sense of what had happened. Even still, there is no clear narrative
arc, no tidy conclusion. Any discussion of my work with Bee is further
complicated by the fact that we interacted in a group setting, as a
dyad within a larger system.
Bee joined the Family Issues group that I co-led at a day
treatment program midway through my first-year placement. She had been
a patient there previously and left an impression on the staff. A white
woman in her 40s, Bee, regardless of the weather, wore a periwinkle
velour sweat suit with her customary iced coffee dribbled down the
front. She had a blank, almost hollow look, her mouth slightly ajar.
Even when Bee was focused on me, I got the sense that she was looking
through me without quite seeing me.
Bee seemed to want so badly, desperately even, to be heard. She
became intensely frustrated when she could not make herself understood;
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yet she was often incomprehensible. She spoke in low tones, swallowing
most of her words before they could escape her lips.
Bee joined the program carrying an array of diagnoses, including
Dissociative Identity Disorder, chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,
and Borderline Personality Disorder. Her past was complicated and
difficult to piece together. I only learned snippets from Bee herself,
and a bit more from the staff and her file. She was abused in her
family, physically and, most likely, sexually. There was also mention
of Bee having been part of a cult, where she may have engaged in
coercive sexual relationships. She had a known history of alcohol
abuse.

Family Issues Group
Family Issues was one of the two groups that I co-led with Dave,
another social work intern. We defined family loosely for the purposes
of the group, so that it included the patients and the staff at our
program. This gave us ample opportunity to talk about relationships
within the group and the program, as well as among more traditionally
defined family, close friends, and community.
The patients enjoyed challenging Dave and me in our role as
intern leaders and would routinely question the parameters of the
group. Two young men in particular much preferred talking about pop
culture and sports to their family relationships. While this could be
frustrating, for the most part their active and enthusiastic
participation made for a group that I found deeply engaging. We had
settled into a fairly comfortable, though somewhat unpredictable,
rhythm when Bee joined us.
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Impasse
Bee’s presence altered the group dynamic noticeably. Because of
past relational trauma, she became upset any time she discussed family.
It was so deeply upsetting for her that we wondered among the staff
whether she should be in a family group at all.
While we encouraged patients to talk about their feelings, we
asked them to stay away from personal details that might be traumatic
for other patients and re-traumatizing for themselves. But Bee couldn’t
seem to stop herself. Any disclosure flowed into spilling, leaving her
despondent and suicidal. During her first session in the group, Bee
described violent abuse, sharing that when she had opened up to her
family in the past she was thrown down the stairs--a detail that was
difficult for Bee and the other patients. As a result, much of our work
as group leaders focused on helping Bee set limits and better titrate
what she chose to share.
Rarely did Bee speak to the group about her experiences of
dissociation, or “switching,” as she called it. At the end of session,
however, as if to underscore how triggered and unsafe she had felt, she
would sometimes tell me accusingly how many times she had switched
during the group.
Family Issues arrived at an impasse just a few weeks after Bee
joined us, in the run-up to the holiday season:
Bee announced to the group: “Someone in the group is doing
something on purpose and I'm triggered. That's why I need to go outside
and take a pill.”
I responded: “If you need a little time out, then go ahead.
You'll come back though?”
“Yes,” Bee replied, then left the room.
Once she was gone, John, a patient, spoke up: “I don't understand
what we did that triggered her.”
Al, another patient, said, “I bet it's me.”
I suggested, “Maybe we can wait until she comes back and ask
her.”
Al, looking visibly uncomfortable, got up to go to the bathroom.
Following our rule about allowing only one group member to leave the
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room at a time, I asked him, “Can you wait a minute, until Bee gets
back?”
Dave, the co-therapist, attempted to steer the group back to our
earlier conversation: “It seems like some of these holidays we are
reminded of people missing from our life. I'm just wondering, what
kinds of things do you do to get through the holidays?”
John, volunteered, “I watch TV, sports.”
Al replied, “Watch TV. I always watch TV. For a year and a half
my TV hasn't been working right.”
I added, “Those are both good distractions. Is there anything
else that people do?”
At this point the group became silent.
I asked, “So, I'm wondering how this group is feeling to
everyone?”
Without missing a beat, Al said, “It feels different from the way
the group usually feels.”
I replied, “How so?”
Al responded: “It feels like people are on edge.”
I said, “Yeah, I agree.”
Bee returned to the room.
I asked her, “Bee, are you doing okay? Can you tell us a little
more about what was bothering you? Or do you need more time to sit with
it?”
Bee, sitting apart from the rest of the group, hesitated. Then,
gesturing in the direction of Dave, the co-leader, and Al, she started
to say, “He…”
I interrupted, hoping she was talking about Co-leader Dave: “Are
you talking about Dave? Or Al?”
Bee replied: “Al. The way he's moving his leg is triggering. It
reminds me of something else. My ex-boyfriend and the cult…”
Al, looking stricken, jumped in: “That's not my intention. I…”
Bee, angrily interrupted him, “What! That's your intention.”
Dave, the co-leader, interceded: “No, he said it's not his
intention.”
Al explained, “I have a bad back. I have a lot of energy. I take
medicine for my legs.”
Bee, plaintively told the group, “I'm not feeling safe.”
I asked her, “Do you want to sit somewhere else? Would that
help?”
After moving to a table apart from the group circle, Bee said, “I
don't feel safe here. This happened in another group. Now I'm by
myself.”
From this point on, we as a group, and particularly Dave and
myself as group leaders, were continually returning to Bee’s safety. Al
and his shaking leg became the focus of all of Bee’s anxiety and
attention. She was alternately threatened and rage-filled toward them
both.
In turn, I found myself worrying that I had failed in my most
basic responsibility as group leader: to create and hold a safe space
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for the patients. Partly because of this, I moved further into
addressing and readdressing Bee’s fear than I might otherwise have. I
always left space for her to bring her anxiety back into the room,
which she did, repeatedly.
I also felt compelled to systematically remove whatever Bee
identified as an external barrier to her safety. I wanted the rest of
the group, Al and myself included, to accommodate her. So when Al
offered to try to stop moving his leg, I agreed. I suggested once more
that perhaps Bee could situate herself so that she would not see Al’s
leg, thinking that she might move to the other side of the circle. Just
as she had done the first day, Bee would remove herself from the rest
of the group and then angrily or plaintively tell us that she felt
separated and apart from us. Alone. My co-intern, Dave, felt that Al,
who was also his individual patient, should not have to adjust his
behavior. In this way, Dave and I found ourselves in a sort of parallel
impasse.

Relational Theory: Enactment
I see now that I was pulled into an enactment with Bee (Ginot,
2009). By taking on the impossible task of keeping her safe in a world
where so much--including a fellow patient moving his leg--was a
potential trigger, I colluded (Darwin, 1999) with Bee’s fears. Rather
than engendering safety, I confirmed and co-created a world that was
inherently dangerous. In wanting to respect, engage, and face her
fears, I think I ended up elevating them. In suggesting she switch
seats, we activated what I imagine for Bee is a continual and fraught
dance between connectedness and autonomy. I now wonder, too, what it
meant for Bee to be in a group therapy at all, in light of her possible
experiences with a cult. In what ways was the group dynamic a
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repetition of that experience? Who was Al for Bee--she said he reminded
her of an ex-boyfriend. Who were Dave and I as group leaders?
From a relational standpoint, it’s possible that I had to be
pulled into an enactment in this way so that I could move a little
closer toward understanding what Bee experienced (Bridges, 2005;
Darwin, 1999; Davies, 1994). It has been suggested that transference
and countertransference may be the only way that “severely traumatized
persons can communicate their stories of distress” (Valent as cited in
Schore, 2002, p. 470). Nor is impasse uncommon among people who have
experienced trauma (Benjamin, 2009).
Sitting with Bee, I often found myself overwhelmed and fearful. I
felt threatened by her presence in a way that I imagine the world could
feel threatening to her. My feeling of never being sure of what to
expect--which part of Bee I would encounter, or whether I would even be
able to understand what she said--may all hint at the way in which she
experiences the world. It’s a world that must feel disorganizing,
confusing, and unpredictable to a person moving in and out of
dissociative states. My somewhat uncharacteristic solution-oriented
response may also have been an empathic mirroring of Bee’s need to be
in control of her environment.
One of my major challenges in working with Bee was our limited
access to a dyadic narrative and dialogue. The context of the treatment
was a group therapy, where the conversation was collective. Though we
did have some success discussing what the group was experiencing, Dave
and I struggled to create the space to reflect on the impasse and our
own experiences of it (Hoffman, 1999; Ginot, 2009). But just as Bee sat
outside the group circle, she often seemed outside of this group
conversation.
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Even when Bee sought me out during milieu time, which she
frequently did, I struggled mightily to understand her. We carried on
parallel conversations. There were times when we were able to connect,
and she seemed soothed or contained by my words. She may even have felt
understood. But just as often my lack of comprehension frustrated her.
And I found myself frustrated by our lack of access to a spoken
narrative. As much as I found Bee slightly terrifying, I also found her
to be sweetly endearing. To help soothe herself, she often carried a
stuffed animal with her. At times I’d look over and see a tiny tiger
peeking out of her purse. And it was moving how desperately she wanted
to connect. Because of all this, the nonverbal realm of infancy studies
seemed like a logical place to turn, in order to try to make sense of
what went on between the two of us.

Infancy Studies: Nonverbal Communication
It took me a while to realize that I tended to dissociate when
Bee was in the group, particularly following the episode with Al’s leg.
I had an incredibly difficult time focusing. I was simultaneously aware
of her presence and my own general sense of uneasiness as I struggled
to really be present in the room. The feeling was somatic, which
infancy studies suggest may be a sign of early, preverbal
communication. At times I would feel almost nauseous and light headed.
One way of understanding this is that Bee was communicating
nonverbally what she could not speak or make understood in any other
way. Much of Bee’s communication seemed centered on the right brain, or
right mind--what infancy researcher Schore (2002) terms “the biological
substrate of the human unconscious” (p. 446). Whereas the left
hemisphere manages verbal communication, an area in which Bee truly
struggled, the right brain is responsible for other communication
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(Schore, 2002). Infant researchers have also shown that the right
hemisphere is where trauma and dissociative responses to trauma, as
well as one’s sense of one’s body, are inscribed in procedural memory
(Schore, 2002).
The right mind is considered the locus of empathy (Schore, 2002).
I believe there may have been some way in which Bee and I were
communicating right brain to right brain, my own dissociative and
physical responses an empathic response to her dissociation. If only
for a few moments, I got a sense of how difficult it was to exist in
such loose and porous states as Bee did.
In considering Beebe’s (Beebe et al., 2005) work with Dolores, I
also wonder what Bee might have seen in my face in these moments, what
I was reflecting of herself back to her? How might she have experienced
my difficulty with self-regulation and soothing? Bee herself had very
little capacity for self-regulation. Like with the mother-infant
interactions that Beebe and Lachmann (2002) observe, she needed the
mutual regulation that a caregiver provides.
Later, I saw how organizing and containing it was for Bee to have
her fears put in perspective. My supervisor’s approach was to reiterate
to Bee that Day Treatment was a safe space and that she was okay and
safe within it. During a community-wide meeting, with all Day Treatment
patients and staff, Bee angrily interrupted to announce that a toilet
in one of the bathroom’s had overflowed. She said this had been
“triggering” for her. I held my breath and watched as my supervisor
responded: Yes, this happens and it would probably happen again, in
which case Bee should let one of the staff know so that they could take
care of it. I was stunned to see Bee’s anger and fear go unaddressed.
Yet her anxiety seemed to dissipate. She was markedly more organized
when, in a sense, told that she was okay, and implicitly shown that she
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was not destroying the group, that the group could be restored
following disruption (Benjamin, 2009).
In the end, I don’t think it was the impasse dynamic that was
problematic for Bee and the rest of Family Issues so much as how we
managed it. As new interns, Dave and I struggled to understand and
navigate the experience on both an explicit and implicit level. I felt
an acute sense of having failed as a container (Benjamin, 2009). Had I
had the theoretical scaffolding to conceptualize the impasse as more
normative and not a failure on my part (Darwin, 1999), I think we would
have better been able to make use of and understand the disruption that
Al’s leg had caused.
Bee continued to struggle throughout her time in Day Treatment,
and ultimately floated out of Family Issues group. She was still a
member, but missed it as often as she came. Because of this, even the
manifest issue of Al’s shaking leg was never fully addressed. By the
time I left my placement, Bee was only attending the program
intermittently.

Summary
What ultimately helps us navigate impasse? And what is mutative?
Is it verbal or nonverbal, articulated or felt, interpreted or lived?
How do we accommodate ourselves to Schore’s (2002) assertion that,
“Psychoanalysis is not ‘the talking cure,’ but more precisely ‘the
communicating cure’ ” (p. 472)? For a person most comfortable with
spoken forms of communication, steeped in language and narrative, as I
know I am, this space can be uncomfortable. I found my somatic
responses in relation to Bee especially unsettling.
Yet Harris (2009) writes, “Enactments may be the place where
speech and action meet and mingle” (p. 15). I would extend this to
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impasse. In impasse, we are given an opportunity to bridge the divide,
loosen the boundaries, and exist on the margins between verbal and
nonverbal ways of being.
Harris (2009), who works relationally, further suggests, “Slight
shifts in experience can give rise to change and great complexity and
difference within very short time frames” (p.6). Whereas neuroscience
has shown that we may actually be changing people’s brains when we
accept disruptions as they occur and willingly repair them. This is all
impasse.
When taken in concert, the disclosure and dialogue of a
relational approach and the procedural and behavioral modes elaborated
by infancy researchers open a therapist’s awareness to all of what may
be happening during times of impasse--the intrapsychic and
interpersonal, relational and behavioral, and manifest and latent.
As for the bigger questions of how we get into impasse, what it
means, and how we find our way through, the more important question may
be: Where can impasse take us?
Rather than something profound, I have come to think of impasse
as more humble, mundane. We move through impasse as we move through
life, because, really, it is just another part of life. As the poet
Mary Oliver said in “A Pretty Song,” the epigraph at the beginning this
paper, ”From the complications of loving you/ I think there is no end
or return. No answer, no coming out of it.” With impasse, too, there is
no answer, no end, no return. We shouldn’t try to come out or get
through it. Instead, we lean in and see where impasse can take us.
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